Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel by Wallach, E. Robert & Kelly, Daniel J.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 10 | Number 2 Article 3
1-1-1970




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
E. Robert Wallach and Daniel J. Kelly, Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 Santa Clara Lawyer 257 (1970).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/3
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE IN
CALIFORNIA: A SHAKY CITADEL
E. Robert Wallach*
Daniel J. Kelly**
Amidst the ever increasing agitation for widespread protection
of the consumer there stands a professional segment of our society
apparently unable or unwilling to join in establishing acceptable
safeguards for the rights of the consumers of their services. The
legal profession continues to adhere to laissez-faire oriented con-
cepts of professional responsibility which are inconsistent with
prevalent concepts of fairness and social justice.
The lawyer who commits a malpractice in the representation
of his clients or who engages in a misappropriation of funds is
protected by a maze of ancient legal principles which make it vir-
tually impossible for the injured client to be made whole or even
for the lawyer to be reprimanded.
A plethora of legal and non-legal literature continues to in-
form us of the increasing obligation upon those who manufacture
a "product" or purvey a service to deal with the public in a manner
which emphasizes considerations of public safety, health and morals,
as well as profit.'
Whether it be the manufacturer of drugs, the meat packer,
the developer of a hair spray or the manufacturer of automobiles,
no one will argue with the proposition that a product must not only
do what it is intended to do but it must do it in a manner which
will not cause secondary harm or unknown consequences to the
user.
Not since the days of Upton Sinclair2 and his "muckraking"
* B.A., 1955, University of Southern California; LL.B., 1958, University of
California, Berkeley; Member, California and United States Supreme Court Bars. Mr.
Wallach has been a frequent lecturer in the Continuing Education of the Bar Programs,
including the 1969 Program on Attorney Malpractice which is now available on tape.
** B.A., 1963, San Jose State College; J.D., 1969, University of Santa Clara;
Member, 'California Bar; Editor-in-chief, SANTA CLARA LAWYER, 1968-69.
1 See, e.g., A. WHITE, ASSASSINATION OF THE CORVAIR (1969); R. NADER, UNSAFE
AT ANY SPEED (1965); Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18
HASTINS L.J. 9 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
2 U. SiNc.Ai, THE JuNGLE (1906).
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colleagues has the public been so motivated and the legislative pro-
cess so responsive to the demands of fair treatment, honest labeling
and candid disclosure.
The law in all of its forms, as legislators, lawyers, and judges,
has led this development by insisting through statute and case
decision that those in a position to bear the responsibility for in-
jury or harm caused by their product must do so. The extensions
of the concepts of strict liability have effectively demolished the
citadel, vitiated the once hallowed concept of caveat emptor and
elevated the consumer into a position from which he can ex-
tract equal justice as against even the most economically powerful
interests.
Beginning with Greenman v. Yuba Power Products3 and ex-
tending through Elmore v. American Motors Corporation4 the man-
ufacturer has been forced to recognize his responsibility, not only
to a consumer but to an innocent third party injured by the opera-
tion of his product.
In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association5 and
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,' the land developer, home builder and
those engaged in the construction of homes were required to recog-
nize obligations to those who occupied the structures which they
built when those individuals suffered injury and harm as a result
of defects inherent in the initial design, installation and construc-
tion of the homes. Even the negligent "design" of a lot imposes
responsibility upon an individual to those who are injured by the
imperfection.7
These dramatic developments are best epitomized by the lan-
guage of the Kriegler case:
Law, as an instrument of justice, has infinite capacity for growth to
meet changing needs and mores. Nowhere is this better illustrated
than in the recent developments in the field of products liability. The
law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and
the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping legal
principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions that make no
sense in today's society and that tend to discredit the law should be
readily rejected. .... 8
3 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
4 70 A.C. 615, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
5 69 'Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
6 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
T Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). See
Also, Adelizzi, Eichler and Avner-Strict Liability in Real Property, 44 Los ANGELES
BAR BULL. 431 (1969).




Perhaps the most striking evidence of the failure of the legal
profession to include itself among those who must realize their
responsibilities to the public is the manner in which the law has
required the sister discipline of medicine to abandon its sacrosanct
and immutable position. Its practitioners have been forced to enter
the courtroom and be subjected to liberalized rules affecting the
statute of limitations, burden of proof and necessity of expert
testimony.
In recent years our courts have determined that the statute
of limitations as against a physician may not even commence to
run as long as a professional responsibility exists between the
physician and the plaintiff.9 The concept of res ipsa loquitur, so
distasteful to the medical profession, was extended to its furthest
limits by the supreme court, leaving virtually no area of medical
skill incapable of being affected by this doctrine.1" Even the most
exotic of surgical procedures may now fall within the purview of
this relaxed rule of evidence."
The medical profession is not alone in feeling the brunt of the
law's social responsibility proddings. Professions whose daily tasks
closely resemble those of many lawyers find themselves without
the protection of a narrow and rigid statute of limitations.12
9 Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal. App. 2d 212, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1964).
10 Tomei v. Henning, 67 Cal. 2d 319, 431 P.2d 633, 62 'Cal. Rptr. 9 (1967);
Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967) ; Quintal v.
Laurel Grove Hospital, 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1964).
11 Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968).
12 Cook v. Redwood Empire Title 'Co., 275 A.C.A. 506, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1969)
[title company]; Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967)
[accountant]. A more complete listing is offered in United States Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 596, 463 P.2d 770, 776, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424
(1970), wherein the Court states: "In . . . situations, such as those where a fiduciary
obligation is involved the courts have recognized a postponement of the accrual until
the beneficiary has knowledge or notice of the act constituting a breach of fidelity.
This has been applied in actions against trustees (Cortelyou v. Imperial Land Co., 166
Cal. 14, 20 [134 P. 981]; agents (Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc.
(1968) 262 Cal. App. 2d 690 [69 Cal. Rptr. 222] (stockbroker); Amen v. Merced
County Title Co. (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 528, 534 [25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 375 P.2d 33] (escrow
agent); Walker v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1960) 183 Cal. App. 2d 513, 516-518 [6 Cal.
Rptr. 924] (insurance agent); Allsopp v. Joshua Hendy Machine Works, 5 Cal. App.
228, 234 [90 P. 39] [disapproved on another issue in Jefferson v. J. E. French Co.
(1960) 54 Cal. 2d 717, 720 [7 Cal. Rptr. 899, 355 P.2d 643]]) ; accountants (Moonie
v. Lynch (1967) 256 Cal. App. 2d 361 [64 Cal. Rptr. 55]) ; and physicians (Huysman
v. Kirsch (1936) 6 Cal. 2d 302 [57 P.2d 908]). The rule that the cause of action
accrues when the negligent act occurs has been strictly applied in attorney malpractice
situations (Chavez v. Carter (1967) 256 Cal. App. 2d 577, 581 [64 'Cal. Rptr. 350];
Griffith v. Zavelaris (1963) 215 Cal. App. 2d 826 [30 Cal. Rptr. 517]; Bustamante v.
Haet.(1963) 222 Cal. App. 2d 413, 414-415 [35 Cal. Rptr. 176]) unless the continuing
nature of the attorney's conduct, and the continuing reliance of the beneficiary
upon his faithful performance, prevent the discovery of negligence until after it has
become irremediable (Hayer v. Flaig (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 223, 229, 322 [74 Cal. Rptr.
225, 449 P.2d 161])."
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Only the lawyer remains singularly protected by the very same
weapon that he has used so effectively against all other segments
of society. The law which has broadened the rights of the general
public remains the vehicle by which the legal profession preserves
itself from similar treatment.
A review of the California law of attorney malpractice is a
revealing demonstration of the protective labyrinth the legal pro-
fession has constructed.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW OF
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA
The Statute of Limitations
California statutory law does not contain a section specifying
the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice. The case law"
is clear, however, that the two-year limitations period of section
339(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 14 is the applicable period of
limitations. Where the services are rendered by an attorney pur-
suant to either a written contingent fee agreement, or any other
written agreement, the four-year period of limitations provided for
in Code of Civil Procedure section 337(1)"' applies.'
The real stumbling block for the injured client is the judge-
made rule that the limitations period runs from the time of the neg-
ligent act and not from the time of its discovery. 7 As is well known,
California has long held that the cause of action for medical mal-
practice does not accrue until the discovery of the negligence.' 8 The
"discovery rule" was also recently applied in an action against an
accountant for malpractice. 9 A comparison of the rule applicable
to doctors and accountants with that for attorneys quickly exposes
13 Alter v. Michael, 64 'Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966);
Yandell v. Baker, 258 Cal. App. 2d 308, 65 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1968).
14 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 339(1) (West 1954). "Within two years: 1. An action
upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writ-
ing . . . . "
15 Id. § 337(1). "Within four years: 1. An action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing .... "
16 Benard v. Walkup, 272 A.C.A. 683, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969); Stone v. Car-
penter, 211 Cal. App. 2d 491, 27 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1963).
17 Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892) ; Bustamante v. Haet, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 413, 35 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1963).
18 Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936). The medical mal-
practice rule was formerly the same as that for legal malpractice. Gum v. Allenj 119
Cal. App. 293, 6 P.2d 311 (1931).
19 Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967). For a
similar ruling against a title company, see Cook v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 275
A.CA. 506, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1969).
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the narrow, parochial and protective nature of the latter. Old adages
such as "we take care of our own" spring readily to mind. As would
be expected, legal commentators have severely criticized this obvious
paternalism.
20
The critics of this harsh rule are no longer peculiar to the groves
of academe. In Yandell v. Baker2l the court, while applying the
general rule, criticized its harshness by stating:
In most cases, as in this, by the time he reasonably could discover the
effect of the attorney's advice, the statute has run, precluding the
client from any redress because of the attorney's negligence. However,
the rule has been established, and we are required to follow the rule. It
can only be changed by the Supreme Court or the Legislature.22
Thus, the gauntlet was thrown down.23
In Heyer v. Flaig24 the Supreme Court accepted the challenge
in part. There, intended beneficiaries sought to recover losses that
resulted to them because the defendant-attorney negligently failed
to fulfill the client's testamentary directions. The defendant argued
that the suit was barred since the testatrix would have been barred
by the statute of limitations had she lived and brought an action on
the date of the plaintiff's suit. The court rejected this argument and
held that if there is a continuing duty on the part of the attorney,
20 See, e.g., Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice, 18 CLEv.-MAR.
L. REV. 82 (1969); Note, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal
Malpractice Actions-The Need for Re-evaluation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 230 (1967).
21 258 Cal. App. 2d 308, 65 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1968). The facts of the Yandell case
are indicative of the harshness of the rule: In January, 1962, the plaintiffs consulted
the defendant attorney regarding a tax program involving the dissolution of the plain-
tiffs' corporation and the distribution and transfer of the corporation's assets. The
certificate of "Winding Up the Dissolution" of the corporation was filed with the
Secretary of State June 11, 1962, and with the Alameda 'County Clerk June 14, 1962.
In July of 1963 the Internal Revenue Service notified the plaintiffs that it rejected
the plaintiffs' version of the tax program. On December 11, 1963, the Service notified
the plaintiffs that they were required to make an additional tax payment of $32,000.
The plaintiffs on December 10, 1964, filed an action for malpractice against all de-
fendants (the attorney and a certified public accounting firm) claiming damages in
the sum of $32,000 and an additional sum of $80,000 which it was alleged they
would sustain because of additional taxes. The plaintiffs appealed a motion sustaining
the defendants' demurrer on the basis of the statute of limitations. The appellate court
held that the statute of limitations began to run at the time the plaintiffs changed
their position in reliance on the attorney's negligent advice, and not at the time they
were informed of the amount owing by the Internal Revenue Service.
22 Id. at 316, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
23 Id. at 316 n.3, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 611 n.3. The Court amplified its dissatisfaction
with the rule with the following language: "In fraud cases, medical malpractice cases,
and we have recently held in accountant's malpractice cases, the statute does not start
to run until the injured party receives, or with reasonable diligence could have re-
ceived, notice of the injury. There does not appear to be any good reason why a
similar rule should not apply in attorney's malpractice cases." (Emphasis added.)
24 70 A.C. 232, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
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after an original act of negligence, and the opportunity to correct
said negligence is available, yet the attorney does not correct the
situation, then the statute of limitations will not commence until the
original negligence becomes irremediable. The rights of the bene-
ficiaries thus may sometimes rise higher than those of the testator
based on the independent nature of the duty of care which accrues
directly in favor of the beneficiaries.
When closely read the Heyer decision portends that the rule
of accrual of the limitations period in legal malpractice may be
short-lived. Footnote seven of the decision indicates that the rule
is not clothed with reason:
[T]he very theories which led to the rule in medical malpractice cases
that the statute runs only from the date of discovery of the negligence
could be applied in the instant situation .... The judicial rule against
postponed accrual of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice
actions rests upon a tenuous basis.25
For the sake of beleaguered clients it can only be hoped that
this language will be prophetic. Presented with the right case, the
court seemingly would give this widely discredited rule its come-
uppance.2" Until that time, as each day passes undetected attorney
defalcations and misconduct reach or approach protective insula-
tion from the aggrieved client.
The Rise And Fall Of Privity Of Contract
In Buckley v. Gray,27 the California Supreme Court adopted
the traditional limitation of insisting on privity of contract before a
plaintiff could maintain an action against an attorney. Thus, the
court held that an attorney who negligently drafted a will was not
liable to a person named in the will who was deprived of benefits
as a result of the error. It was also reasoned that there could be no
recovery on a third party beneficiary theory since the contract was
not expressly for the plantiff's benefit 2 -thus he was an incidental
beneficiary.
The stringent privity test was later rejected in Biakanja v.
Irving.29 There, a notary public who prepared a will" negligently
failed to direct proper attestation. The supreme court held that the
25 Id. at 242-43 n.7, 449 P.2d at 168 n.7, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 232 n. 7.
26 Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 1954): "When the reason of a rule
ceases, so should the rule itself."
27 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
28 Id. at 342-43, 42 P. at 900.
29 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
0 Id. Although unauthorized to practice law.
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defendant was liable in tort to an intended beneficiary who was
damaged because of the resulting invalidity. To replace the privity
rule a balancing test was added. Whether a defendant will be held
liable to a person not in privity requires consideration and balancing
of various factors, including:
1. To what degree the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff;
2. The foreseeability of harm to him;
3. The degree of certainty of plaintiff's injury;
4. The causal relationship between the defendant's conduct
and the injury; and,
5. The policy of preventing future harm.3
In 1961 the California Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm 3
held that lack of privity between the plaintiff and the attorney would
no longer bar an action against the attorney for negligence. The
effect of the Lucas decision was best summarized as a showing that
"[t]he citadel of privity is collapsing and that some of it is tum-
bling about the ears of the lawyers." 3
The court in Lucas was naturally concerned whether elimina-
tion of the privity requirement in this type of case would place too
great a burden on the members of the legal profession. The court
answered in the negative:
We are of the view that the extension of his liability to beneficiaries
injured by a negligently drawn will does not place an undue burden
on the profession, particularly when we take into consideration that a
contrary conclusion would cause the innocent beneficiary to bear the
loss.34
In the recent case of Heyer v. Flaig,3" the California Supreme
31 Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
32 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962). The defendant-attorney, in violation of instructions and in breach of
contract, negligently prepared testamentary instruments and ran afoul of the rule
against perpetuities. Plaintiffs, as intended beneficiaries, were thereby forced to settle
their share of the estate at a loss of $75,000 from the sum they would have received
had the defendant drafted in accordance with the testator's directions.
33 Meehan, Careless Lawyers and Careworn Third Parties, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV.
99 (1961). Many legal commentaries followed the Lucas decision. See, e.g., Note, 14
STAN. L. REV. 580 (1962); Note, 40 TEx. L. REV. 1046 (1962); Note, 64 W. VA. L.
REV. 361 (1962).
34 Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 'Cal. Rptr. 821, 824
(1961).
35 70 A.C. 232, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969). Here again the case in-
volved an attorney who failed to fulfill the testamentary directions of his client.
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Court reiterated its Biakanja-Lucas rationale. The balancing test
of Biakanja was again stressed by the court.86
It is beyond cavil that the effect of Biakanja and Lucas will be
material; "They could very easily become as well known to attor-
neys who handle similar cases as MacPherson v. Buick is to at-
torneys handling cases concerning product liability. .... ))37
Attorney's Negligence-From Question of Law to Question of Fact
California long adhered to the minority view that the ques-
tion of whether there had been malpractice by an attorney was a
question of law. Gambert v. Hart's first considered the problem and
ruled as follows:
In actions of this character against attorneys, the rule is well settled
that when the facts are ascertained the question of negligence or want
of skill is a question of law for the Court.8 9
With obvious misgivings, the Court of Appeal in Floro v.
Lawton4" reviewed the Gambert case but did not decide the ques-
tion. Finally, Ishmael v. Millington41 put the rule of the Gambert
case to rest with the following language:
Breach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury; if the circum-
stances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant's conduct
violates the boundaries of ordinary care, the doubt must be resolved
as an issue of fact by the jury rather than of law by the court. 42
86 The real import of the Heyer decision is its effect on the statute of limitations.
37 Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2
LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 396 (1967).
38 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
89 Id. at 552.
40 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 675, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 109 (1960), wherein the Court
states, ". . . a review of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that if the Gambert
case is the law in this state, then we hold to the minority view."
41 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966). However, it has been effec-
tively stated that there still may be a judicial reluctance to submit the issue to the
jury; see Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63 CoL. L. REv. 1292, 1306 (1963). "Al-
locating responsibility between judge and jury in attorney malpractice suits raises
questions even more delicate and complex than those presented in ordinary negligence
cases, which normally involve mixed questions of law and fact. The nature of the
relationship between bench and bar inevitably influences judicial attitudes. It is not
entirely unrealistic to suppose that some judges may be influenced by their sympathy
for fellow attorneys; other judges who feel strongly about improving the legal pro-
fession may treat an erring attorney with excessive harshness. Moreover, since judges
are constantly exposed to a wide range of legal issues, they may believe that they
are uniquely qualified to evaluate the difficulty of the problem that faced the de-
fendant attorney."
42 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1966).
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This needed metamorphosis of law to fact took well over three-
quarters of a century, to the consternation of clients caught in the
transition.
Prohibition of Expert Testimony
In most jurisdictions, expert evidence as to the standards of
practice and negligence is admissible in malpractice actions against
attorneys .4  Again, California adhered to a minority view. Since the
question of attorney malpractice in California was long viewed as a
question of law," not fact, it was thus also held that the testimony
of an expert was inadmissible.
As noted earlier, 5 the legal malpractice suit is now viewed as
but one variety of negligence and is therefore governed by the gen-
eral doctrines (i.e., question of fact) prevailing in negligence ac-
tions. 6 Seemingly, (and logically), the admissibility of expert
testimony will follow suit. The recent case of Lysick v. Walcom 47
perhaps demonstrates the future course of the law in this area.
There, two attorneys testified at the trial as to the relevant standard
of care. The court of appeal, while not discussing the propriety of
the use of the expert testimony, held that such expert evidence is
conclusive as to the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the
locality as well as the propriety of the defendant's conduct. The
court's rationale is both probative and instructive:
This rule has been applied in California to medical malpractice cases,
and while no cases have been found in this state applying the rule to
legal malpractice, there is no reason why the rules of evidence for mal-
practice against a lawyer should not be the same as those governing
cases against doctors. It has been so held in other jurisdictions. Accord-
ingly, when the matter in issue is within the knowledge of experts only
and not within the common knowledge of laymen, expert evidence is
conclusive and cannot be disregarded.4 8
It would be overly optimistic to think that the difficulty in
obtaining expert testimony will be less prevalent among attorneys49
43 Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959);Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1442 (1968).
44 Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
45 See text at note 42 supra.
46 Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
47 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
48 Id. at 156, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 419.




than it is among physicians.50 When the "conspiracy of silence" is
coupled with the client's problem of finding a lawyer who is willing
to sue his brethren, it can only be concluded that litigation in this
area will be an inadequate and speculative remedy.
NEXT STOP: RES IPSA LOQUITUR
It is easily recognizable that there will be many circumstances
in which a client might be unable to pinpoint the exact act of pro-
fessional neglect which led to his untoward result.5 ' The mere
mention of the Rule Against Perpetuities will suffice as one exam-
ple of the many inherent complexities of legal matters.52 The plain-
tiff's task of proving attorney malpractice will be complicated by
the reluctance of attorneys to testify against their fellow attorneys.
These same obstacles confront the injured plaintiff seeking to prove
negligence on the part of the doctor. However, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has proven to be an effective "instrument" in aiding
the plaintiff to overcome the obstacles in proving medical mal-
practice.53
California decisional law on attorney malpractice is singularly
devoid of any discussion of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur.
Elsewhere there is limited (and well aged) authority holding the
doctrine to be inapplicable. 54 Yet, there remains a striking similarity
in the litigation problems facing the injured patient and the care-
worn client. The similar sounding pleas of the patient and client
fall upon the same ears: those of the bench and bar. While they
listened and acted in the case of medical malpractice, a combination
of auditory and ataxic aphasia sets in when the client's problems
with his lawyer are the subject. This protective malady and the
other contrived distinctions between medical and attorney malprac-
tice are at best opprobrious, as well as potentially damaging to the
public's confidence in the legal profession. As one legal commen-
tator has noted:
50 Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 483, 234 P.2d 34, 45 (1951) (dissenting
opinion): "It is a matter of common knowledge that members of any county medical
society are extremely loath to testify against any other member in a malpractice case."
Further judicial recognition of the "conspiracy of silence" is found in Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957). See also Belli,
An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 ViL. L. REV.
250 (1956).
51 This again points out the harshness of the judicial rule against postponed
accrual of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions.
52 "There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error." GRAY,
TnE RuLE AGAiNST PERPETurrEs xi (4th ed. 1942). See also Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.
2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
63 Note, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 691 (1967).
5 Olsen v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
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Because erosion of public confidence in the legal profession would in-
evitably undermine respect for the entire legal system, it is particularly
important that the public not have basis for believing that attorneys
are afforded special treatment that effectively insulates them from
liability.55
RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES
If we as a profession are prepared to accept the responsibilities
demanded by this New Society, the method by which we.implement
the procedures for an effective resolution of disputes between clients
and their attorneys should be our foremost consideration. It is a
time for innovative ventures.
The alternatives are clear. We can commence down the road
followed by the medical profession and eventually find ourselves
governed on a case by case basis until we arrive at the same in-.
exorable end point as has that profession. It will be possible forlitigation to wend its way through the appellate courts and with the
inevitable passage of time, find that res ipsa loquitur does apply,
that the statute of limitations does not begin to commence while the
professional relationship exists, and that the doctrine of informed
consent is applicable to lawyers, to name but a few of the ramifica-
tions that have progressively lightened the burden of those seeking
to institute claims against the medical profession.
That procedure is admittedly arduous and time-consuming.
More important, it means that an untold number of litigants must
be the reluctant vehicle by which this path is worn.
The mere prospect of venturing down the same laborious road
as was traveled in determining the posture of medical malpractice
litigations should be enough to discourage us. An alternative sys-
tem can be made to function assuming the good faith desire of the
legal profession to make it work.
There are two separate but related problems that must be
dealt with.
A Clients' Security Fund
First, the client whose funds have been misappropriated must
be reimbursed. The procedure for reimbursement need not be a'
complex one and there is precedent for its adoption. The client secu-
rity fund is neither a new nor a novel concept in the legal pro-
fession.5
55 Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLuTm. L. REV. 1292, 1312 (1963).56 New Zealand first originated a clients' security fund in 1929. Presently, there
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Basically the purpose of the fund is to make the aggrieved
client whole. Payment is made solely to reimburse persons who
have had funds embezzled or misappropriated by their attorneys
and does not cover clients' claims arising over fees or other
items falling generally within the term "legal malpractice." Ideally,
the fund is financed through an allocated percentage of each at-
torneys' State Bar Association dues.57 The clients' security fund
is not meant to serve either as a substitute for professional disci-
pline or as malpractice insurance. It is, however, "the only finan-
cial salvation for the client who has suffered a loss through the
lawyer's defalcation, other than a recovery from the lawyer him-
self, and he may be insolvent, bankrupt or unavailable to citation.""8
On a national level the advocates for such funds are numer-
ous.5" The fund has also been the subject of discussion within our
own State Bar in past years.60 For reasons probably more attrib-
utable to inertia than to decision making, no definite step leading to
the development of a state wide client security fund has been under-
taken by the California State Bar. That such a development is long
overdue has been recognized by at least one of our appellate courts:
We think it urgent that the State Bar not only institute a client se-
curity fund but also put in effect stronger measures than presently
exist for the protection of clients' money in the hands of attorneys, a
combination of measures which would do more to improve the respect
of the general public for attorneys than all the press agentry and public
relations programs of the past decade.
61
The primary argument lodged against the fund is that the pro-
fession as a whole bears no moral guilt or owes no pecuniary re-
sponsibility for the unfortunate client selecting a lawyer who does
not live up to the standards of the profession. 2 The limitations of
this argument have been effectively pointed out by others." Indeed
are thirty-one active state bar association clients' security funds. There are also local
funds in metropolitan areas, such as Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Baltimore and New
York. See generally Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where
Does the Legal Profession Stand?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 382 (1967); Bryan, Clients'
Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757 (1969).
57 Various insurance or indemnity plans have been proposed for clients' security
funds. Thus far, probably due to insufficient actuarial information, no American in-
surance company has offered either primary or excess coverage.
58 Bryan, supra note 56.
59 Smith, The Client's Security Fund: A Debt of Honor Owed by the Profession,
44 A.B.A.J. 125 (1958) ; Voorhees, The Case for the Clients' Security Fund, 42 J. Am.
Juv. SoC'Y 155 (1959). See also authorities cited in note 56, supra.
60 Sterling, A Clients' Security Fund, 34 J. ST. B. CAL. 243 (1959).
61 Blackmon v. Hale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569, 582 (1969), vacated, 1 Cal. 3d 548 (1970).
62 Sterling, supra note 60.
63 See Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where Does
the Legal Profession Stand?, 42 NOTRE DAMtE LAW. 382 (1967).
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it is difficult to even develop a cogent argument against the creation
of such a fund if the primary consideration is the responsibility of
the legal profession to the public rather than some narrow concept
of pecuniary gain or loss to the individual attorney.64
As a corollary to the public good generated by a client security
fund, the profession will also benefit from a public relations stand-
point. It is easily recognized that "[t]he public looks to the profes-
sion to keep its own house in order and when a lawyer embezzles
his clients' funds, the whole bar is blackened in the public eye." 65
The immeasurable harm done to the whole profession by an un-
scrupulous attorney can be effectively countered when the public
is made aware of the bar's preeminent dedication to the aggrieved
client. The clients' security fund would be a clear manifestation of
that dedication.
Impartial Legal Panels
The second and distinct area of professional responsibility
which must be recognized is the proper handling of attorney mal-
practice claims. The difficult questions involved in determining the
standard of care that should have been employed by a professional
person in the handling of a particular problem has plagued all spe-
cialties. Our own circumstance is unique in that we are already
equipped to establish the forums and provide expert judges to pass
on this issue.
It is initially essential that the courts or the legislature elimi-
nate the arbitrary and formalistic statutes of limitation rules which
presently exist. A rule of "discovery" analogous if not identical to
that imposed upon the medical profession is inherent in the fiduciary
relationship which we recognize to each of our clients. 6 But be-
yond this the mechanism by which an attorney's conduct will be
effectively and impartially judged can be readily assembled through
the cooperation of the practicing bar and within the structure of
the organization of the State Bar.
A system can be developed by which a client who believes he
14 R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES, at 5 (1953):
"Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose[of a profession]. Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it
is the entire purpose."
65 ABA Special Committee on Clients' Security Fund Rep. 3 (Feb., 1959). See
also Sterling, supra note 60.
66 Cox v. Delmas, 99 Cal. 104, 123 (1893), "[A] fiduciary relation of the very
highest character . .. [which] . ..binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity-




has received professional care below the standard expected to be
exercised by a competent attorney may apply to the State Bar
through a formal complaint procedure to be established by them.
A. The complaint (a comprehensive statement of facts) would
be reviewed by an attorney employed by the State Bar in
order to determine whether or not facts existed sufficient
to warrant further inquiry."
B. If the State Bar attorney believes that facts exist which
are sufficient to warrant further investigation, the attorney
involved should then be notified so that he can in turn pre-
pare his own statement of facts in response.
C. If the State Bar attorney believes that the factual or legal
issues presented warrant further inquiry a panel should be
appointed consisting of three attorneys who would then
review the evidence involved, take testimony if necessary,
and render a decision. The panel should be drawn from
attorneys who practice in a geographic area removed from
that of the attorney charged with the alleged act of pro-
fessional neglect. This is a particularly important qualifica-
tion in order that the same degree of effectiveness will exist
in a small or medium-sized community as would exist in a
major metropolitan area. It is imperative that any possibil-
ity of the appearance of a "club or fraternity" atmosphere
be eliminated by determining in advance that the attorneys
selected as the panel members have no connection with the
lawyer under investigation.
D. In the event that the panel determines that no deviation
from the standard of care has occurred, the client would,
of course, be entitled to utilize his common law rights to
seek counsel and proceed with a civil action that would
then be defended by the professional malpractice liability
carrier of the attorney involved.
E. If the panel were to determine that a deviation from the
standard of care had occurred in the representation of the
client, then the senior member of the panel (designated by
the State Bar) voting in that manner would be obligated
to render a written report and to testify on behalf of the
client in the event of civil litigation."
67 This is essentially the same system in operation at the present time relating to
State Bar disciplinary matters.




F. The proceedings of the panel would be confidential so that
the remaining panel members would be immune from sub-
poena and prohibited from disclosing their views concern-
ing the facts presented to them regardless of whether they
concurred or differed.
Upon notification to the parties of the panel's decision that the
attorney had engaged in conduct which did not meet the prevailing
standard of performance, it is to be expected that he would im-
mediately advise his professional malpractice liability carrier. It
also seems a reasonable assumption that that insurance carrier,
faced with the finding of the panel, would give serious consideration
to the settlement of this dispute without the necessity of incurring
litigation expenses.
An analogous procedure exists in the medical malpractice area
with the institution of medical-legal panels in several medical as-
sociations. Ideally, these panels provide objective doctors who ex-
amine a claimed malpractice case and if it is malpractice, furnish
expert testimony. However, the analogy to the performance of the
medical-legal panels is not totally satisfactory. While it is true that
in many instances a finding of medical malpractice by a panel
doctor will produce the settlement of the case without trial, a finding
in favor of the physician seldom convinces a patient's attorney of the
weakness of his case. The lawyer's inherent reluctance to accept
the judgment of one physician upon the conduct of another limits
the effectiveness of these panels.
Obviously, the suggested panel system for the determination
of disputes involving lawyers does not carry with it this inherent
prejudice. The subject matter under consideration by the panel is a
subject matter with which they are competent to deal and which
the lawyers representing the attorney involved can fully understand.
So long as there is confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the panel itself (by both attorney and client) experience would in-
dicate that attorneys representing malpractice insurance carriers 9
would be heavily influenced by a decision of a lawyer member of
the panel adverse to them.
The subject of what damages would be necessary to compen-
sate the client for an attorney's misconduct would probably not
come within the purview of such a panel unless the loss had to be
69 It well may be that in the future all attorneys will be required to be covered
by malpractice insurance as a prerequisite to membership in the integrated state bar.
It is the authors' understanding that the State Bar has been trying to obtain statewide
malpractice insurance but has as yet been unable to put together a conglomerate of
insurance companies willing to undertake the risk.
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fixed within a specific period of time or related to certain other
liquidated accounts.
The problem of assessing damages in attorney malpractice is
not comparable to that of assessing damages for injury resultant
from an act of medical malpractice. While there may be consider-
ations of emotional distress involved in lawyer conduct it is un-
likely that the elements of damage resulting from an attorney's
misconduct will be as vague as "pain and suffering." In any event,
experienced trial lawyers will quickly acknowledge that if the issue
of liability is determined the subject of damages is most often
capable of resolution.
The suggested mechanics of this procedure can undoubtedly
be subjected to improvement and modification, but if we recognize
that some procedure for the resolution of attorney-client disputes
must exist it will not be difficult to arrive at a plan which will serve
the interests of the public. A method of protecting the public with-
out the necessity of subjecting it to the harassment and uncertain-
ties that presently prevail in actions against other professional
groups is paramount. The concept of requiring members of a pro-
fession to institute litigation against members of the same profes-
sion is inherently designed to encourage suspicion on the part of
the client and distrust on the part of the public. The creation of
impartial legal panels will serve to assuage the public's skepticism.
CONCLUSION
The State Bar, as an integrated bar created by statute 7 0 is
quasi-public and its responsibility to the public should be even
greater than the fiduciary responsibility normally imposed upon it
by virtue of the attorney-client relationship. This obligation, as well
as the prevailing social tendencies of the times, is sufficient to require
that we arrive at a program of efficient administration of profes-
sional liability claims that will allow redress to the individual with-
out undue harassment to the attorney. This responsibility, while
great, is not difficult to meet. The legal profession is an honorable
profession increasingly skilled and highly motivated by fundamen-
tal concepts of social obligation. Those members of the profession
who engage in conduct that is morally or legally reprehensible con-
stitute an infinitesimal fraction of the bar. There can be no ques-
tion but that we have a responsibility to protect the public from
them.
70 Cal. Stats. 1927, ch. 34, § 1, at 38 (1927), as amended Cal. Stats. 1939, ch. 34,
§ 1, at 347 (1939) (Codified at CAL. Bus. & Paop. CODE §§ 6000-6154 (West 1962)).
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By creating a clients' security fund and an impartial profes-
sional mechanism for the handling of claims against attorneys sub-
stantial progress will be made in elevating the reputation of our
profession among the public, as well as fulfilling more completely
our responsibility to them.
It is axiomatic that we live in a rapidly changing society which
increasingly demands that the efficient administration of justice
maintain as its primary consideration an ultimate concept of Fair-
ness. To a profession long bound by a tradition of rigid language,
technicalities, and formalistic procedure, this swiftly moving cur-
rent of popular demand may seem alien and incompatible, but it is
the inherent strength of the Law that it has a never ending capacity
to adapt itself to the demands of the times in which it must be
applied. 7' This obligation to make the law relevant and meaningful
to the individual citizen must be a paramount obligation when we
are concerned with the efficient adjudication of our own profession's
obligation72 to the public.
71 See text at note 8 supra.
72 The law has defined the public obligation of other professions in terms of the
law's admonitory policy-that is, in both preventive and punitive terms. See Connor
v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1968).
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